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During the Warren Court era, a heady period of expansive jurisprudence,1 
Miranda v. Arizona was especially noteworthy because the United States 
Supreme Court used that decision to dramatically revise its confessions 
jurisprudence.2  Miranda extended the privilege against self-incrimination 
to custodial interrogations and represented an effort by the Court to gain 
control of the police and their investigatory procedures by regulating the 
interrogations process—and, specifically, by requiring the police to 
administer a Miranda warning to suspects before engaging in custodial 
interrogation.3  The decision also had the effect, perhaps unintended, of 
educating the public regarding its rights, as subsequent movies and 
television shows depicted the police administering the Miranda warnings. 
 * Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, 
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3. Id. at 444–45. 




In some respects, the Miranda decision was relatively uncontroversial 
because the Court did little more than require the police to inform 
suspects of their rights and prescribe procedures for the waiver of those 
rights.  But Miranda’s holding was not inevitable.  In the Court’s later 
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court held that suspects can 
consent to searches of their persons or property even though they have 
not been informed that they have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse 
consent.4  A critic of Schneckloth might legitimately question how suspects 
can validly waive Fourth Amendment rights that they do not know they 
possess and why the police should not be required to inform suspects of 
their rights before seeking a waiver.  Miranda, at least, avoids this 
criticism by requiring that suspects receive such information. 
As will be developed more fully below, despite the limited nature of 
the Miranda decision and the advantages that flow from its media impact, 
Miranda was not a panacea for the Court’s confessions jurisprudence.  
In Miranda, the Court tried to sort out a muddled area of jurisprudence, 
but it is not clear that the Court succeeded. 
I.  PRE-MIRANDA CONFESSIONS JURISPRUDENCE 
In the years leading up to Miranda, the Court struggled to find its 
footing in the confessions area.  For decades, the Court evaluated confessions 
under the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
For example, in Brown v. Mississippi, the Court rejected confessions that 
were obtained by whipping defendants with a leather strap that had 
buckles attached to it, as well as by hanging men by their necks from a 
tree.5  In concluding that the confessions were coerced, the Court held 
that the “rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness 
stand” without violating due process.6
Although the Court applied due process analysis in a number of cases 
following the Brown decision,7 the test never proved to be entirely 
satisfactory.  A number of Justices expressed concern about the fact that 
too many confessions cases devolved into swearing matches regarding 
what the police had done, and whether the defendants had been coerced 
into involuntary confessions.8 As Justice Douglas noted in one dissent, 
 4. 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973). 
 5. 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936). 
 6. Id. at 285–86. 
 7. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321–24 (1959); Ashcraft 
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). 
 8. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, RONALD BACIGAL, JOHN M. 
BURKOFF, CATHERINE HANCOCK & DONALD E. LIVELY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 433 n.3 
(2d ed. 2004). 
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the “trial on the issue of coercion is seldom helpful,” with the police 
“usually testify[ing] one way, the accused another.”9 He concluded that 
the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove coercion at 
trial.”10
As the Court’s dissatisfaction with the due process test grew, the 
Court began searching for alternative ways to deal with confessions 
issues.  In McNabb v. United States11 and Mallory v. United States,12 the 
Court relied on a federal statute13 and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure14 to establish the proposition that a criminal defendant must 
be arraigned “without unnecessary delay” and that a confession obtained 
during the delay might be excluded from a subsequent prosecution.15  
However, this so-called McNabb-Mallory rule never developed into a 
constitutional rule, and Congress attempted to overrule it by subsequent 
legislation.16  By the time of the subsequent legislation, the McNabb-
Mallory rule had been effectively supplanted by the Miranda decision. 
Then, the Court flirted with the possibility of using the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel as a way to deal with custodial interrogations.  This approach 
involved a radical reinterpretation of the right to counsel, which had 
previously been viewed as applying only at the trial stage.17 Although 
counsel must be appointed sufficiently far in advance of trial to allow for 
adequate preparation, the right was not applicable to preindictment 
interrogations.18  The case of Cicenia v. Lagay presented the Court with 
an extraordinary opportunity to extend the right to counsel to custodial 
interrogations.19 In that case, not only did Cicenia request the right to 
speak with his attorney, the attorney was present at the stationhouse 
 9. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting, 
joined by Warren, C.J., Black & Brennan, JJ.), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
 10. Id. at 444. 
 11. 318 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1943), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as 
recognized in United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 12. 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as 
recognized in United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1945) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app. R. 5(a) (2000)). 
 14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
 15. Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455. 
 16. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,      
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)). 
 17. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 18. Id. 
 19. 357 U.S. 504, 506–07 (1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 




demanding to speak to him, and remained at the stationhouse throughout 
the entire afternoon trying to meet with his client.20  The police precluded 
Cicenia from speaking to his attorney by secluding him in a room, and 
ultimately preventing the two from speaking until after Cicenia confessed.  
Although the Court expressed distaste for the police practices in the 
Cicenia case, it upheld the conviction on grounds that defendant’s right 
to counsel was not violated: “New Jersey is not alone in its rule that an 
accused has no right to consult with counsel during the period between 
arrest and arraignment.”21
In the landmark decision Massiah v. United States, the Court shifted 
course and used the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude a 
confession that was obtained from a criminal defendant who had been 
indicted and for whom counsel had been appointed.22  When the police 
surreptitiously interrogated Massiah through an informant, the Court 
held that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.23
The Court extended Massiah in Escobedo v. Illinois.  Escobedo involved 
a defendant who was implicated in a murder, taken into custody, and 
transported to the police station.24  The police rejected Escobedo’s repeated 
requests to speak with his attorney, and they also rejected his attorney’s 
requests to speak with him until the police had completed their 
interrogation.25  Applying a “critical stage” analysis,26 the Court held that 
the right to counsel applied to the interrogation because, otherwise, 
defendant’s confession could prejudice his trial, and rights “may be as 
irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an 
accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.”27  
Escobedo held that the right to counsel attaches when “the investigation 
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to 
focus on a particular suspect.”28
II.  THE MIRANDA REVOLUTION 
In Miranda, the Court took its confessions jurisprudence in an entirely 
different direction, and ultimately retreated from Escobedo (but not 
Massiah), basing its decision on the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination rather than on due process or the Sixth Amendment 
 20. Id. at 505. 
 21. Id. at 510 n.4. 
 22. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964). 
 25. Id. at 481. 
 26. Id. at 486. 
 27. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)). 
 28. Id. at 490. 
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right to counsel.29  As with the Court’s decision to extend the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in Massiah, this extension of the privilege 
against self-incrimination was problematic in terms of prior precedent.  
The privilege against self-incrimination had not previously been applied 
to custodial interrogation situations that occurred prior to the commencement 
of the adversary process. 
Miranda was a striking decision because the Court relied extensively 
on police interrogation manuals advocating the use of psychological 
techniques rather than torture.  For example, the manuals advised police 
to isolate suspects in private situations—the stationhouse—where the 
police have all the advantages30 and where the “atmosphere suggests the 
invincibility of the forces of the law.”31  During the interrogation process, 
the police are urged “to display an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt 
and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming 
certain details.”32  The suspect’s guilt is taken as fact, and the interrogator 
encourages the suspect to confess by directing 
his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than 
court failure by asking the subject whether he did it.  Like other men, perhaps 
the subject has had a bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much 
to drink, had an unrequited desire for women.33
The police are also instructed to 
minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on 
society.  These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state 
where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know 
already—that he is guilty.  Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and 
discouraged.34
If these techniques do not succeed, the interrogator is instructed to resort 
to more aggressive techniques such as the “Mutt and Jeff” technique.35
While the Court did not view these psychological techniques as 
rendering confessions involuntary in traditional terms, it did conclude 
that such tactics exact “a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on 
 29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). 
 30. Id. at 450 (citing CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
99 (1956)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (citations omitted). 
 35. Id. at 452. 




the weakness of individuals.”36  The Court emphasized that such interrogation 
techniques produce “inherently compelling pressures.”37  In an effort to 
provide “adequate protective devices” against these psychological tactics 
and prevent a suspect from being forced to incriminate himself, the 
Court required police to administer the Miranda warning and comply 
with the procedures outlined in its decision.38  In other words, the police 
were required to respect a suspect’s assertion of his right to remain silent 
and his right to counsel. 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH MIRANDA 
It is not clear that the Miranda decision has turned out to be a panacea 
to the confessions problem.  For one thing, there was an important disconnect 
in Miranda.  Although the Court spent a good deal of time discussing 
interrogation manuals and psychological techniques in its opinion, there 
was no evidence that the manuals had been relied upon or used against 
any of the defendants whose cases were consolidated before the Court.  
As Justice Clark noted in his concurrence: 
The materials [the Court] refers to as “police manuals” are, as I read them, 
merely writings in this field by professors and some police officers.  Not one is 
shown by the record here to be the official manual of any police department, 
much less in universal use in crime detection.39
Indeed, issues related to the manuals were raised in amicus briefs rather 
than by the parties to the case.  Moreover, Miranda did not involve proof 
that any of the confessions before the Court were either coerced or 
unreliable.  Indeed, there was evidence to the contrary.  As Justice Harlan 
argued in dissent, “These confessions were obtained during brief, daytime 
questioning conducted by two officers and unmarked by any of the 
traditional indicia of coercion. . . .  There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, 
no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice in the 
interrogation.”40
Because there was no proof of coercion in Miranda itself, or necessarily 
in other cases where the police failed to give the Miranda warnings, it 
was easy to argue that unwarned confessions should not be suppressed.  
While the Court has generally reaffirmed Miranda, the Court did attempt 
to distinguish Miranda in its subsequent decision in Michigan v. 
Tucker.41  In Tucker, the Court held that a voluntary confession should not 
 36. Id. at 455. 
 37. Id. at 467. 
 38. Id. at 458. 
 39. Id. at 499 (Clark, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 518–19 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 41. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
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be excluded from evidence even though Miranda’s dictates were not 
observed.42  The Court regarded the Miranda warnings as prophylactic 
and held that a mere failure to comply with Miranda’s warning 
requirement did not necessarily result in a “breach [of] the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination.”43  As the Court later said in Oregon v. 
Elstad, the failure to warn was not an “actual infringement of the 
suspect’s constitutional rights.”44
Even though Tucker has not gained ascendance in post-Miranda 
jurisprudence, the decision does reveal some of the inherent problems in 
Miranda.  As noted, Miranda tended to assume that the custodial interrogation 
environment is inherently coercive.  But, if the Court’s assumption is 
correct, it is difficult to understand how Miranda’s requirement of 
prophylactic warnings provides adequate protection for suspects being 
interrogated.  After the Miranda warning is administered, the suspect remains 
in what the Court assumes to be an “inherently coercive” context, and 
the mere administration of the warnings might not be sufficient to 
overcome the coercion.  In Miranda itself, the Court recognized this fact 
when it stated that the “circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation 
can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware 
of his privilege by his interrogators.”45  The Miranda Court attempted to 
respond to this concern by providing suspects with the right to counsel, 
as well as by requiring the police to inform suspects of their rights.46  
But as Justice White argued in dissent in Miranda: 
If the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as “Where 
were you last night?” without having his answer be a compelled one, how can 
the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to 
consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?47
There is much force to Justice White’s argument.  When the decision 
about whether to waive is made, the circumstances are stacked in favor 
of the police.  The police can isolate a suspect in an interrogation room 
before attempting to seek a waiver.  Although the Miranda warning provides 
suspects with some information, many suspects will understand little 
else about criminal law or the rules of evidence.  For example, suspects 
 42. Id. at 445–46. 
 43. Id. at 445. 
 44. 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
 45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). 




may believe that they can talk themselves out of the situation by offering 
an alibi or other excuse and may not understand that they are making 
incriminating admissions or otherwise prejudicing their future defense.  
By the time suspects realize that they should have kept quiet, it may be 
too late.  Moreover, if suspects fail to assert their rights, the police are 
free to utilize many of the interrogation techniques outlined in Miranda. 
Another potential problem with the Miranda decision is that once the 
warnings are administered, the Court is much more likely to find that 
any ensuing confession is voluntary and admissible.48  For example, in 
Connecticut v. Barrett, after being given a Miranda warning, the defendant 
signed a form stating that he would not give a written statement unless 
his attorney was present, but that he had “no problem” talking about the 
crime.49  Several times thereafter, defendant made it clear that he would 
not give a written statement, but that he was willing to give an oral 
statement.  The Court rejected the argument that defendant’s knowledge 
regarding the consequences of an oral statement was sufficiently incomplete 
as to nullify his consent: “Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose 
between speech and silence, and Barrett chose to speak.”50  The Court 
also rejected the argument that Barrett’s distinction between oral and written 
statements indicated “an understanding of the consequences so incomplete 
that we should deem his limited invocation of the right to counsel 
effective for all purposes.”51  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, 
dissented, arguing that Barrett had effectively requested counsel.52
Also illustrative of the insulating effect of a Miranda warning on the 
validity of a confession is the holding in Moran v. Burbine.53  In that 
case, the defendant was in custody when his sister obtained a lawyer to 
represent him.  The lawyer telephoned the police station, but was told 
that the police “were through with [the interrogation] for the night.”54  
About an hour later, the police resumed their questioning of Burbine, 
who waived his privilege against self-incrimination.55  The Court concluded 
that the waiver was valid: “Events occurring outside of the presence of 
the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on 
 48. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987); Connecticut v. 
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994); 
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296–97 (1988).  But see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 
600, 616–17 (2004). 
 49. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525. 
 50. Id. at 529. 
 51. Id. at 530. 
 52. Id. at 536–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 53. 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986). 
 54. Id. at 417. 
 55. Id. 
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the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional 
right.”56
Part of the justification for the decisions in both Barrett and Moran is 
that there was no evidence that either defendant was coerced into 
incriminating himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, or that either confession was necessarily so 
unreliable that its admission violated due process.  That said, the known 
circumstances regarding each case are sufficiently disturbing, and the 
available facts sufficiently limited, so that one might legitimately question 
whether the confessions were really voluntary and informed. 
IV.  WERE THERE ALTERNATIVES? 
As a prophylactic decision, Miranda—and its requirement of a 
warning—seems sensible enough, and it is not clear that other alternatives 
would have been as effective.  One thing that the Court could have done 
in Miranda was to require the presence of counsel for every custodial 
interrogation.  While this step might have been extremely effective in 
ensuring that confessions are not coerced, there are perhaps good 
reasons why Miranda did not opt to require counsel.  For one thing, the 
cost of such a requirement would be substantial.  The states already incur 
significant costs related to Gideon v. Wainwright,57 and the requirement 
that states provide indigents with appointed counsel before subjecting 
them to the penalty of imprisonment.58  If states were required to provide 
suspects with counsel for all custodial interrogations, these costs would 
escalate dramatically.  It is unlikely that the Court would impose such a 
requirement on the states. 
Dissenting in Miranda, Justice White, joined by Justices Harlan and 
Stewart, suggested a number of alternative steps the Court could have 
taken in lieu of imposing a warning requirement.  Specifically, he suggested 
that: 
Even if one were to postulate that the Court’s concern is [that some] confessions 
induced by police interrogation are coerced . . . and present judicial procedures 
are believed to be inadequate to identify the confessions that are coerced and 
those that are not, it would still not be essential to impose the rule that the 
Court has now fashioned.  Transcripts or observers could be required, specific 
time limits, tailored to fit the cause, could be imposed, or other devices could be 
 56. Id. at 422. 
 57. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 58. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 51 n.1. 




utilized to reduce the chances that otherwise indiscernible coercion will produce 
an inadmissible confession.59
It is not clear that any of these steps would have been a panacea either.  
While it would be nice to have a transcript of custodial interrogations, a 
skillful interrogator can ask questions that will sound perfectly 
reasonable in transcript form even though the interrogator’s tone and 
inflection are more coercive.  Having an observer present in the room 
would provide additional insight into police tactics and the potential for 
abuse, but it might be costly to mandate that observers be constantly 
present.  Moreover, while specific time limits might be fine, a coercive 
interrogation might still produce a coerced confession within the allowable 
time limits. 
Another thing that could be done, but by contrast would be relatively 
easy and inexpensive, is to require that interrogations be recorded.  This 
option is attractive because it provides video evidence of what happened 
and allows a reviewing court to assess whether a confession really was 
coerced.  While this option was viable when Miranda was decided, it has 
become much more viable in the following decades as the cost of 
recording technology has decreased and the quality of such technology 
has increased.  In many contexts, it should not be difficult to record custodial 
interrogations, and to allow the courts to see whether the police have 
used coercive techniques to gain a confession.  However, a recording 
requirement is likely to work better in large jurisdictions that can afford 
to install video equipment in a special interrogation room.  Moreover, 
many interrogations (or, at least, quasi-interrogations) take place outside 
the context of police stations—for example, at the place of arrest or on 
the way to the police station—so that a recording room might not be 
practical.  Nevertheless, the court might gain some tangible benefit from 
requiring the police to record confessions whenever possible. 
A videotaping requirement is potentially beneficial because it does not 
alter or affect the dynamics of the interrogation process.  One of the concerns 
about Miranda was that suspects who were given warnings, or provided 
with counsel, might choose to remain silent and refuse to cooperate with 
the police.  Justice Clark’s Miranda concurrence emphasized that 
the interrogation of witnesses is “an essential tool in effective law 
enforcement.”60  In his Miranda dissent, Justice Harlan expresses concern 
about the fact that the warnings might deter suspects from talking to 
police.61  Obviously, a videotaping requirement does not necessarily interfere 
 59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 535 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 502 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 
514 (1963)). 
 61. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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with the interrogation process.  Indeed, if the police are concerned about 
the effect of videotaping on the process, they can conceal videotaping 
machines in unobtrusive places.  Justice Harlan described the decision as 
“poor constitutional law” and suggested that it “entails harmful consequences 
for the country at large”62 because “the thrust of the new rules is to 
negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and 
ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”63  By contrast, 
videotaping is passive and would not discourage confessions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
At forty years, Miranda presents a mixed bag.  Miranda had a positive 
effect on the confessions process because it encouraged and required the 
police to provide suspects with information regarding their Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Moreover, because the Miranda decision has been 
embraced by the media and shown in thousands of television shows and 
movies, it has had a very broad and profound educational effect.  On the 
other hand, although Miranda attempted to articulate a bright-line rule 
designed to avoid the confusing problems created by preexisting 
confessions law, it is not clear that Miranda succeeded.  The Court did 
create a bright-line rule—for example, before engaging in custodial 
interrogation, a suspect must be given a Miranda warning and must 
voluntarily waive his rights—but it is not clear that this rule has 
accomplished its objective of protecting defendants against inherently 
coercive interrogation environments.  Moreover, one can argue that 
Miranda has an undesirable effect because it encourages courts to affirm 
convictions if the Miranda warning has been given. 
The net effect is that Miranda has not turned out to be a panacea.  It 
has not redefined confessions jurisprudence, nor obviated the need to 
rely on prior confessions jurisprudence.  In subsequent cases, the Court 
has been forced to continue to apply due process principles, but with the 
same reservations and the same difficulties as before.64  In addition, the 
Court has continued to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
interrogations in Massiah contexts (post-indictment interrogations).65  
 62. Id. at 504. 
 63. Id. at 505. 
 64. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). 
 65. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 
475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400–01 (1977). 




However, the Court seems to have abandoned Escobedo in the sense that 
the Court has not applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
suspects who have not been indicted and who are simply the “focus” of a 
criminal investigation.66  So, while there is value in the Miranda decision, 
especially because of its educational effect, it may be time for further 
refinements—for example, requiring videotaping of custodial interrogations. 
 
 66. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
